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I. INTRODUCTION

In the recent case of Gamut Trading Co. v. U.S. InternationalTrade
Commission,' the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
expanded the trademark protection available under the Tariff Act of
1930.2 Specifically, the court held that the importation and subsequent
resale of goods bearing legally affixed trademarks can infringe the same
trademark in the United States, despite the fact that the imported goods
are second-hand goods.' While the Federal Circuit classifies this case as
1. 200 F.3d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
2. Gamut was charged with violation of § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 which
prohibits, "[tlhe importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the sale
within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, consignee, of articles
that infringe a valid enforceable United States trademark registered under the Trademark
Act of 1946." 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (a)(1)(C).
3. See Gamut Trading Co., 200 F.3d at 781.

a gray market case, the fact that this case involved the importation of
second-hand goods makes it distinguishable from gray market case law.
Additionally, the fact that all the goods subject to this dispute were
effectively controlled by the same entity should have precluded a finding
of trademark infringement. This case note addresses both of these
points.
II. BACKGROUND FACTS
This case was initially brought by the Kubota Corporation of Japan
("Kubota-Japan"), and its U.S. affiliates, Kubota Tractor Corporation
and Kubota Manufacturing of America (collectively "Kubota-US"),
before the U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC"). The ITC
upheld Kubota-Japan's and Kubota-US's claims that the unauthorized
importation and resale of used Kubota tractors by Gamut Trading
Company ("Gamut") violated section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
Upon appeal, a two-judge panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the
ITC's decision.6
At the source of this dispute is the fact that Kubota-Japan, like many
multi-national companies, tailors its tractor designs for specific regions
of the world, yet Kubota-Japan affixes the same trademark on all of its
tractors.7 For instance, in Japan, where Gamut purchased its Kubota
tractors, Kubota-Japan sells tractors adept to rice paddy farming.
Among other qualities, these models have narrow wheelbases and are
designed to maneuver in wet, muddy conditions.8 For the U.S. market,
Kubota-Japan sells tractors adept to heavy lifting, transporting raw
materials, and functioning with heavy weight blades used for cutting
rough undergrowth.9
It is notable that all of the tractors subject to this dispute were foreignmanufactured tractors, manufactured in Kubota-Japan's Japanese
factory.'
While Kubota-Japan has licensed the use of the Kubota
trademark in the U.S. to Kubota-US, Kubota-Japan is the registered
owner of the Kubota trademark in the U.S.." Kubota-Japan's licensing
agreement with Kubota-US expressly provides that any goodwill
associated with the Kubota mark remains the "exclusive property" of
4. See In the Matter of Certain Agricultural Tractors Under 50 Power Take-Off
Horsepower, 44 U.S.P.Q. 2d. 1385 (1997).
5. See Gamut Trading Co., 200 F.3d at 777.
6. See id. at 776.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See In the Matter of Certain Agricultural Tractors, supra note 4, at 1407.
1I. See Gamut Trading Co., supra note 5, at 776.
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Kubota-Japan, not Kubota-US. 2
III. GRAY MARKET GOODS AND THE TERRITORIALITY DOCTRINE
Generally, the term "gray market goods" refers to goods bearing
legally affixed trademarks that are imported without the consent of the
domestic trademark owner.'3 While gray market goods bear legally
affixed trademarks, their importation may nonetheless infringe the same
trademark in the U.S. when imported without the consent of the
domestic trademark owner.'4
In the 1923 case of A. Bourgois & Co. v. Katzel,5 the United States.
Supreme Court conceived of the territoriality principle. Under this
principle, a trademark has a separate legal existence in each country and
is entitled to the protection afforded by the laws of that country. 6
Basically, the territoriality principle recognizes two purposes of a
trademark. First, like its predecessor, the universality principle, 7 the
territoriality principle recognizes that a trademark identifies the source
of the product.'8 Second, and more importantly, the territoriality
principle protects "the goodwill of the domestic markholder whose
reputation backs the particular product in that territory."' 9

12. See id. at 777
13. See TIMOTHY H. HIEBERT, PARALLEL IMPORTATION IN U.S. TRADEMARK LAW 1
(1994) (citations omitted). The terms "gray market" and "parallel importation" are often
used interchangeably. However, the term "gray market" actually encompasses more
than parallel importation. Parallel importation requires both the U.S. trademark owner
and a third party to import their goods. A gray market, however, can originate when the
U,S. trademark owner does not import its goods. In such a situation, there is no parallel
importation because only the alleged "infringer" is importing goods. See id. at 13 n.1.
14. See generally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29.19[4].
15. 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
16. See id. at 692.
17. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Katzel, 260 U.S. 689
(1923), trademarks were governed by the universality principle which offered no
protection against gray market goods. Under the universality principle, transferring
ownership of the product effectively extinguished the trademark owner's ability to
control the product's downstream flow in commerce.
Under this approach, a
trademark's sole purpose was to identify a product's origin. Therefore, a foreign
trademark could not infringe a U.S. trademark if it correctly identified the origin or
source of the product, regardless of where the consumer purchased the product.
18. See, e.g., Osawa&Co. v. B &H Photo, 589F. Supp. 1163,1171-72 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
19. Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 663 (3d Cir. 1989)
(emphasis added).

To determine whether a domestic trademark's goodwill is damaged by
the importation of gray market goods bearing the same trademark, courts
generally employ a material differences analysis. When gray market
goods have material differences from their domestic counterparts
bearing the same trademark, the goodwill that domestic consumers
associate with the trademark is jeopardized. 0 Domestic consumers, who
are not aware they are purchasing gray market goods, may mistakenly
associate or confuse any of the good's inferior qualities with the U.S.
trademark owner and not the foreign trademark owner."
A.

MaterialDifferences Is Not the Test When Dealing
With Second-Hand Goods

Essentially, the holding in Gamut Trading Co.22 rests on the premise
that because Gamut's tractors are materially different from Kubota-US's
tractors, Gamut's tractors were likely to damage the goodwill that
domestic consumers associate with the Kubota trademark.23 Because this
case involved the importation of second-hand tractors, the Federal
Circuit's reliance on the material differences test is inappropriate.
In Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders,24 a case not cited in the
Federal Circuit's opinion, the United States Supreme Court held that
consumers of second-hand goods have lower expectations than
consumers of new goods.25 As long as the used goods are not being
passed off as new goods,
26 the Court held that any differences or
"inferiority is immaterial.,
Despite the holding of Champion Spark Plugs, the Federal Circuit
nevertheless held that Gamut's imported tractors infringed the Kubota
trademark based on the fact that the imported tractors possessed material
differences from the authorized Kubota tractors. The Federal Circuit
notes, "the basic question in gray market cases concerning goods of
foreign origin is not whether the mark was validly affixed, but whether
there are differences between the foreign and domestic product and if so
whether the differences are material."" The Federal Circuit further
states, "[s]ubstantial evidence supports the [ITC's] finding that
20. "[I]f there are material differences between the gray market imports and the
authorized imports, then the gray market imports are not 'genuine' imports and can
create a likelihood of confusion." MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 29.19[4].
21. See id.
22. 200 F.3d 775.
23. See id. at 783.
24. 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
25. See id. at 129.
26. Id. at 129-30 (emphasis added).
27. Gamut Trading Co., 200 F.3d at 779 (emphasis added).
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consumers would consider the differences between the used imported
tractors and the authorized Kubota-US tractors to be important to their
purchasing decision, and thus material."2 There is little doubt that the
Federal Circuit's opinion relies on the material differences test, and, to
that extent, the opinion conflicts with Champion Spark Plugs.
In Champion Spark Plugs, defendant, Sanders, was in the business of
reselling second-hand spark plugs, all of which had been reconditioned,
repaired, yet still bore their original "Champion" trademark. Despite
the fact the performance of the reconditioned spark plugs was materially
inferior to the performance of new spark plugs, the Court found such
evidence inapposite to the trademark analysis. ° Moreover, the Court
expressly noted that while the second-hand dealer derives some
advantage from the trademark, the Court held that such advantage "is
wholly permissible so long as the manufacturer is not identified with the
inferior qualities of the product resulting from wear and tear or the
reconditioning by the dealer."'"
Although the Federal Circuit's opinion does not expressly address the
holding in Champion Spark Plugs, the evidence in the record tends to
show that it is unlikely that Gamut's consumers actually identified the
accused tractor's inferior qualities with the Kubota trademark. The
senior vice president of Kubota-Japan testified that, "[Kubota-US's
tractors] [are] not in competition with the infringing tractors because the
consumer who is looking for a new tractor and the customer who is
looking for a used tractor (i.e. a gray market tractor), have different
requirements; and that, while there is some overlap, generally there is a
difference in price and a difference in condition."32 Implicit in this
testimony is the notion that consumers understand and knowingly
assume that second-hand products are inferior compared with new
products. In Champion Spark Plugs, the Court recognized that
consumers generally pay much less for second-hand goods, and
consequently, consumers expect the performance and quality of second28. Id. at 782.
29. See Champion Spark Plugs, 331 U.S. at 126.
30. See id. at 129.
31. Id. at 129-30 (emphasis added).
32. This quote comes from the ITC's published opinion before it was published in
the United States Patents Quarterly, 44 U.S.P.Q. 2d. 1385. This quote and substantial
portions of the ITC's opinion do not appear in the U.S.P.Q. edition. The quote can be
found in the complete ITC published opinion. See In the Matter of Certain Agricultural
Tractors Under 50 Power Take-Off Horsepower, Inv. No. 337-TA-380, U.S.I.T.C. Pub.
3026 (March 1997), 1996 WL 901435, at 65-66.

hand goods to be inferior compared with new goods.33
It is notable that all of the tractors subject to the dispute in Gamut
Trading Co. were between the ages of 13 and 25 years old.34 It is selfevident that the older a product becomes, the lower the expectations of
its consumer will be, and the more likely that consumers will identify
any of the product's inferior asR ects with the fact that the product has
been reconditioned or repaired. Additionally, evidence in the record,
presented by Kubota-Japan, showed that the used gray market tractors
were selling at a 65 to 90 percent discount compared to the new
Kubota.36 In light of the age, discounted price, and lack of competition
between the new and accused tractors, it seems extremely unlikely that a
consumer would identify a used tractor's inferior qualities with the
Kubota trademark.
In its opinion, the Federal Circuit notes that their was "evidence that a
purchaser of such a used tractor ...did not realize that he was not
buying an authorized tractor or that service and parts were not available
from the Kubota-US dealerships."37 While the above purchaser may
have been disappointed with the fact that replacement parts were
difficult to obtain, his testimony fails to establish that he perceived the
quality or performance of the tractor to be inferior. It is conceivable the
above purchaser was extremely satisfied with his tractor's lighter weight
and superior maneuverability compared to the much heavier domestic
Kubota models. 8 Hence, the unavailability of replacement parts does
not address the threshold issues, whether the gray market tractors were
perceived to be inferior.39
33. See Champion Spark Plugs, 331 U.S. at 129-30.
34. See Gamut Trading Co., 200 F.3d at 777.
35. Accord Champion Spark Plugs, 331 U.S. at 129-30.
36. See In the Matter of Certain Agricultural Tractors Under 50 Power Take-Off
Horsepower, 1996 WL 901435, at 214.
37. See Gamut Trading Co., 200 F.3d at 781.
38. See id. at 776.
39. This case note concedes that under the material differences test, courts have
found that the material differences analysis is not limited to physical differences.
However, once the analysis becomes divorced from the physical differences, a trademark
is essentially given monopoly type power. In the Fifth Circuit case, Martin's Herend
Impbrts, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., the court alluded to a situation
where a gray market good may be deemed materially different despite the fact that the
product is actually identical to its domestic counterpart. Martin's Herend Imports, Inc.
v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1997), The court stated
that a finding of materiality, "depends not only on the 'quality' of such goods as
measured in some objective or scientific sense, but on the ability to impart on the
domestic consumer a view that the goods are rare, collectable, elegant, chic, or otherwise
highly desirable pieces to own." Id. at 1302. Because the influx of identical goods could
make the goods seem less rare or unique, imported gray market goods that are identical
to the domestic goods could be found to infringe the domestic trademark. See id.
Therefore, according to the 5th Circuit, material difference could be found, despite the
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Even assuming that the unavailability of replacement parts somehow
makes the gray market tractors "inferior," it still must be established that
Gamut's customers identified the tractors' inferiority qualities or
performance with the Kubota trademark, and not with the fact that the
tractors were second-hand. ' The only evidence referenced in the court's
opinion that even addresses this point, albeit inadvertently, is the above
testimony. Conceivably, this testimony could show that a purchaser
disappointed with the unavailability of replacement parts associated and
identified his disappointment with Kubota, and not with the fact that his
tractor was an older model tractor. However, this argument pushes the
bounds of credibility. Considering the age, discount, and lack of
competition between the new and used tractors, it is difficult to believe
that a consumer failed to realize that replacement parts may have been
difficult to obtain. However, it is likely that a customer disappointed
with his gray market Kubota tractor, would have identified the tractor's
poor performance with the fact that the tractor was a second-hand
refurbished tractor. In such a case, there has been no damage to the
Kubota trademark and associated goodwill. 1
As noted above, consumers of second-hand products knowingly
accept certain risks, including the risk that replacement parts may not be
available.42 Surely, the Ford Corporation could not claim that the
unauthorized resale of its older model cars infringes the "Ford"
trademark based on the fact that Ford dealerships no longer carried
replacement parts.4 ' Accordingly, the Federal Circuit's opinion fails to
credibly establish that Gamut's consumers identified the tractor's
"inferiority" with the Kubota trademark.
Instead of addressing the holding of Champion Spark Plugs, the
Federal Circuit cites to three cases for the proposition that "used goods
can be gray market goods." 44 In Red Baron-FranklinPark, Inc. v. Taito
Corp.,45 one of the cases relied on in the Federal Circuit's opinion, the
court held that the importation of second-hand coin operated video
arcade games violated the copyright owner's exclusive right to public

fact that
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

the products are identical in every sense of the word. See id.
See Champion Spark Plugs, 331 U.S. at 130.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 129.
Gamut Trading Co., 200 F.3d at 783 (emphasis added).
883 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1989).

performance under copyright law.4 6 It is notable that the right to public
performance is a unique aspect of copyright law and there is no such
protection found in trademark law. Moreover, the court in Red BaronFranklin Park expressly noted that had the case involved the
"distribution of the copyrighted work"47 that is more like the present
situation in Gamut Trading Co., the first sale doctrine would have
precluded a finding of copyright infringement.
Clearly, Red BaronFranklin Park provides little guidance as to whether the importation of
second-hand goods infringes the domestic trademark.
The Federal Circuit also cites Sims v. FloridaDep't of Highway Safety
and Motor Vehicles.49 In that case, the term "gray market" was used in

the context of the Clean Air Act, which has no relation to its use under
trademark law. Under the Clean Air Act, the term "gray market" refers
to any imported automobile that does not comply with U.S. emissions
and safety standards. ° Under such a definition, even brand new
products imported by the domestic trademark owner would be
considered "gray market," if the products did not comply with the Clean
Air Act requirements." Conspicuously absent in any of the cases cited
by the Federal Circuit is the issue raised in Champion Spark Plugs;
whether consumers identified the inferior qualities of the second-hand
tractors with the trademark. Moreover, none of the cases cited in the
Federal Circuit's opinion were applying the material differences test to
gray market, second-hand goods.
B. The Common Control or Ownership Exception
While the Tariff Act of 19302 on its face bars the importation of all
gray market goods, the United States Customs Service allows the
importation of gray market goods when a U.S. trademark owner or
licensee, and a foreign trademark owner or licensee are under common
control or ownership. 3 As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
46. See id. at 280.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 279.
49. 862 F.2d 1449, 1451 (11th Cir.1989).
50. See id. at 1455.
51. See id.
52. 19 U.S.C. § 1526. Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, provides that "it shall
be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if
such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a
trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized
within, the United States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person
domiciled in the United States... unless written consent of the owner of such trademark
is produced at the time of making entry." Id.
53. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2). This provision applies when the foreign and
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has stated, when common control exists "articles produced and sold
abroad by the foreign owner may be imported by anyone since the
trademark owner has itself either introduced or authorized the
introduction of the articles into commerce and thereafter may not
unreasonably restrict the use of the product."54 Under this rule of law,
companies that are under common control or ownership are viewed as a
single entity, and thus are precluded from controlling their products
beyond their initial sale.
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court in K-mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc.," affirmed the application of the common control exception under
section 526 of Tariff Act of 19306 In particular, the Court upheld a
U.S. Customs' regulation that permits the entry of goods manufactured
abroad under what the Court called a Case 2 scenario." This scenario
arises when a domestic firm that registers the U.S. trademark for
foreign-manufactured goods is either (a) a subsidiary of the foreign firm,
(b) the parent of a foreign firm, or (c) the same as the foreign firm, and
goods bearing the same trademark as that registered in the U.S. are
imported." In such a case, there can be no trademark infringement, due
to the relatedness of the domestic and foreign entities. The Ninth Circuit
has noted that common control can be established by showing "the
foreign and domestic entities [are] sufficiently connected that either firm
can effectively control the introduction of goods into the stream of
international commerce."59 Common control can also be established by
showing "the sort of control that a parent corporation would exercise
over a subsidiary or that a common owner might exercise over both
organizations. ' 6°
In Gamut Trading Co., the Federal Circuit neglects to even address the
common control exception; yet, the facts of this case appear to satisfy
the elements of a Case 2 fact pattern. First, while a Case 2 pattern
domestic trademark owners are parent and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject
to common control or ownership. See id.
54. United States v. Eighty-Nine Bottles of "Eau De Joy," 797 F.2d 767, 771 (9th
Cir. 1986) (quoting Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. U.S.,
598 F.Supp. 844, 849-50 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.
1986)).
55. 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
56. 19 U.S.C. § 1526.
57. See K-mart, 485 U.S. at 292.
58. See id.
59. See Eighty-Nine Bottles, 797 F.2d at 772.
60. Id. at 771.

generally involves a U.S. firm that has registered a trademark in the
U.S., common control is even easier to establish, as in Gamut Trading
Co., when the U.S. firm is not even the registered trademark owner. The
Federal Circuit notes that the license agreement between Kubota-US and
Kubota-Japan expressly provides that "the U.S. trademark and6
associated goodwill remain the exclusive property of Kubota-Japan. '
Because Kubota-Japan is the registered owner of the Kubota trademark,
and not Kubota-US, the facts of this case are well within the bounds of a
Case 2 pattern on this element.
Next, a Case 2 scenario requires all of the goods to be foreignmanufactured goods.62 It is undisputed that all of the tractors subject to
this dispute were foreign-manufactured goods, manufactured by KubotaJapan in its Japanese factories. 6 Thus, this element of a Case 2 pattern is
likewise satisfied.
The last element of a Case 2 scenario is the entity relatedness
requirement. ' Although the exact corporate relationship is not touched
upon in the Federal Circuit's opinion, it seems apparent that Kubota-US
lacks meaningful control over the tractors it sells, and is effectively at
the mercy of Kubota-Japan's manufacturing decisions. The evidence in
the record tends to support this conclusion. In ITC's Finding of Fact, the
court stated that, "[Kubota-US] ...assembles, distributes, markets, sells,
and services tractors manufactured by [Kubota-Japan]and specifically
designed for the U.S. market." 65 The Federal Circuit's opinion seems to
confirm Kubota-US's limited role, and refers to Kubota-US's role as
maintaining a "distributorship/service system." 66 In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, the evidence in the record makes it clear that
the power to tailor tractor models for different markets is reposed solely
with Kubota-Japan.
Because Kubota-US is essentially powerless over the manufacturing
decisions, it seems apparent that Kubota-Japan has the power to
"effectively control the introduction of [tractors bearing the "Kubota
67
trademark] into the stream of international commerce.,
By extending trademark protection to Kubota-US under these
61. Gamut Trading Co., 200 F.3d at 777 (emphasis added).
62. See K-mart, 485 U.S. at 292.
63. See Gamut Trading Co., 200 F.3d at 777.
64. See K-mart, 485 U.S. at 292.
65. In the Matter of Certain Agricultural Tractors Under 50 Power Take-Off
Horsepower, Inv. No. 337-TA-380, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 3026 (Mar. 1997), 1996 WL 901435,
at 74 (emphasis added).
66. See Gamut Trading Co., 200 F.3d at 781.
67. See Eighty-Nine Bottles, 797 F.2d at 772 (quoting Coalition to Preserve the
Integrity of American Trademarks v. U.S., 598 F. Supp. 844, 849-50 (D.D.C. 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
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circumstances, the Federal Circuit extended Kubota-US trademark rights
and benefits for which it has not bargained and which it cannot
legitimately expect Kubota-Japan not to circumvent.68 As previously
mentioned, under the territoriality principle, a trademark protects a
domestic trademark's goodwill that is separate and distinct from the
foreign trademark's associated goodwill. Indeed, the "[territoriality]
principle recognizes that a trademark has a separate legal existence
under each country's laws, and that its proper lawful function is not
necessarily to specify the origin or manufacture of a good, but rather to
symbolize the domestic goodwill of the domestic markholder." 69
However, when a foreign company owns all of the goodwill associated
with the trademark in the U.S., as does Kubota-Japan, trademark law
should not protect goodwill that the U.S. trademark owner does not own
or in which he has proprietary rights. Additionally, the fact that KubotaJapan controls the manufacturing decisions for both the Japanese and
U.S. markets further supports the premise that Kubota-US is controlled
by Kubota-Japan. Taken in its entirety, the above evidence tends to
show Kubota-Japan possesses "that sort of control that a parent
corporation would exercise over a subsidiary or that a common owner
might exercise over both organizations."7
C. The Tariff Act and Common Control
In K-mart, the United States Supreme Court expressly held that the
common control exception applies to claims brought under the Tariff
Act; however, the Court did not reach its application to claims arising
under the Lanham Act.7'
In Gamut Trading Co., the Federal Circuit neglects this distinction,
thereby rendering a finding of common control superfluous to the
trademark infringement analysis under the Tariff Act. The Federal
Circuit states that "when there are material differences between the
domestic product and the foreign product bearing the same mark, most
of the courts that have considered the issue have excluded the gray
goods, even when the holders of the domestic and foreign trademarks

68. See NEC Electronics, Inc. v. Cal Circuit Abco, Inc., 810 F.2d 1506, 1510 (9th
Cir. 1987).
69. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
70. Eighty-Nine Bottles, 797 F.2d at 772.
71. K-mart, 486 U.S. at 290 n.3; 15 U.S.C. § 1127.

are relatedcompanies...."72
This statement is misleading. First, the Federal Court ostensibly
decides this case under the Tariff Act of 1930,13 yet the court cites only
cases decided under the Lanham Act. In Lever Brothers Co. v. U.S., 4 a
case decided under the Lanham Act and relied upon in the Federal
Circuit's opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that Customs' "[common control] exception does not
square with section 42 [of the Lanham Act]." 75 However, in Lever
Brothers II the Circuit Court expressly noted that it's holding does not
apply to claims under the Tariff Act of 1930.76 Indeed, the Lever II court
acknowledged that under the Tariff Act of 1930, the Supreme Court's
opinion in K-mart controlled, 7 a distinction the Federal Circuit
overlooks.
Even assuming that Gamut Trading Co. was decided under the
Lanham Act, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third and the
Ninth Circuits have held that the Supreme Court's holding in K-mart
applies to cases decided under the Lanham Act.78 Consistent with the
rest of its opinion, however, the Federal Circuit neglects to address the
jurisdictional split on this issue, and applies Lanham Act case law.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Federal Circuit's decision in Gamut Trading Co., unjustifiably
expands trademark protection under the Tariff Act of 1930. First, the
court fails to adequately consider that Gamut's tractors were secondhand tractors.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit misplaces their
analysis, focusing on the material differences. Fundamentally, the
material differences test rests on the premise that a trademark's goodwill
is necessarily damaged when an inferior product is sold under the same
trademark. However, when dealing with the resale of second-hand
goods, the Unites States Supreme Court's holding in Champion Spark
Plugs makes it clear that a trademark's goodwill is not necessarily
damaged.

72. Gamut Trading Co., 200 F.3d at 779.
73. The court decided this case under § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §
1337.
74. 981 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
75. See Lever Bros. Co. v. United States., 877 F.2d 101, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
76. See Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d at 175-6 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
[hereinafter Lever II].
77. See id.
78. See Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 668 (3d Cir. 1989);
see also NEC Electronics, Inc. v. Cal Circuit Abco, Inc., 810 F.2d 1506, 1510 (9th Cir.
1987).
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Second, the Federal Circuit ostensibly decides this case under the
Tariff Act of 1930, yet the court fails to adequately address the common
control exception. The facts in the record tend to indicate that this case
satisfies the K-mart Case 2 fact pattern. Indeed, the facts tend to
indicate that Kubota-US has neither any ownership in the Kubota
trademark, nor any power over the manufacturing decisions.
Last, the Federal Circuit overlooks the fact that this case was brought
under the Tariff Act and not the Lanham Act. While courts are split
over the application of the common control exception to cases brought
under the Lanham Act, K-mart makes it clear that the common control
exception applies to the cases brought under the Tariff Act.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit analyzes this case as if it were being
decided under the Lanham Act.
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit's analytical flaws lead to the
overprotection of Kubota-Japan's trademark. Kubota-Japan should not
be able to invoke trademark law to protect itself from the very situation
it created and has power to correct. Such problems should be resolved in
the boardroom of Kubota-Japan, not the courtroom.

SEAN A. BARRY
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Washington.
Laura McKenna (Managing Editor), B.A. 1999, University of
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Dan Lickel (Executive Editor), B.A. 1996, Harvard University.
Michael Decina (Lead Articles Editor), B.A. 1999, Santa Clara
University.
Ben Hirasawa (Chief Executive Comments Editor), B.A. 1994,
University of Colorado.
Kanika Corley (Student Comments Editor), B.S. 1999, University of
Southern California.
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